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PARTS A N D PROPERTIES IN ARISTOTLE’S CATEGORIES
Phil Corkum
University of California, Los Angeles
Presented to the Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy at its meeting with the Eastern
Division of the American Philosophical Association December 28,2002, in Philadelphia

Abstract
Call a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and
nonrecurrent otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are
nonrecurrent properties has spawned a lively debate among recent commentators.
An assumption held in common by both sides of the debate is that a property is
nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue
that this assumption is false. There are a variety of kinds of separation in
Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is relevant, we
will see that the inseparability possessed by individual properties is neutral on the
question whether such properties are recurrent or nonrecurrent. In particular. I’ll ;
argue that Aristotle is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts, cannot;
be severed from their subjects.

Call a property recurrent if it can be found in more than one subject, and nonrecurrent
otherwise. The question whether Aristotle holds that there are nonrecurrent properties has
spawned a lively debate among recent commentators. An assumption held in common by
both sides of the debate is that a property is nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an
individual subject. In this paper, I’ll argue that this assumption is false. I’ll proceed as
follows. In this introductory section, I’ll explain the issue and sketch the dialectic of the
debate; then I’ll argue in more detail that both sides of the debate make this assumption;
finally, I’ll argue against the assumption.
Aristotle’s fourfold classification of beings in the Categories—into individual
substances, universal substances, nonsubstantial individuals and nonsubstantial
universals—is expressed in terms of the notions of being present in a subject and being
said of a subject: individual substances such as Callias are neither said of, nor present in,
a subject; universal substances such as human are said of, but not present in, a subject;
nonsubstantial universals such as color are both said of, and present in, a subject;
nonsubstantial individuals are present in, but not said of, a subject. What sort of things
are nonsubstantial individuals? Aristotle’s examples are a “certain item of grammatical
knowledge” present in a soul and a “certain paleness” present in a body. But it is not clear
from these examples whether nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent or nonrecurrent.
Can your soul and mine share the same certain item of grammatical knowledge? Can your
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body and mine share the same paleness? Nonsubstantial individuals are inherent or in a
subject, and much of the debate on this issue has centered on the apparent definition of
this notion at Categories la24-5:
By ‘in a subject’ I mean (lego) what is in something (tint), not as a part, and
cannot exist separately (adunaton choris einai) from what it is in (tou en ho
estiri)}
As I will show in more detail below, the assumption that a property is nonrecurrent if it is
inseparable from an individual subject drives much of the dialectic of the debated reading
of la24-5. Those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties
read la24-5 as claiming that any nonsubstantial individual is inseparable from its subject,
an individual substance; and those who hold that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent
read la24-5 as only committed to the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are
inseparable from some of the subjects in which they are found, but not from the
individual substances in which they are found. However, the assumption that a property is
nonrecurrent if it is inseparable from an individual subject is false. There are a variety of
kinds of separation in Aristotle. When we focus attention on what notion of separation is
relevant to a reading of la24-5, we will see that the inseparability possessed by individual
properties entails neither that such properties are recurrent nor that they are nonrecurrent.
In particular. I’ll argue that la24-5 is only claiming that inherent properties, unlike parts,
cannot be severed from their subjects. This offers. I’m afraid, a deflationary position on
the relevance of la24-5 to the question of nonrecurrent properties. The modest aim of the
paper is to shift scholarly focus away from la24-5 and towards passages which might
shed better light on the issue.

A nonrecurrence reading of la24-5
Although the view that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties was
something of an orthodoxy before 1965, John Ackrill’s (1963: 74-5) reading of la24-5
provides an explicit argument for the view. He interprets the passage as giving the
following necessary and sufficient condition for inherence:
(A)

X is in2 y just in case: '
(i) xis'in,y
(ii) X is not a part of y
(iii) X cannot exist independently from y .2

As Ackrill (1963: 74) notes, (A) is circular unless we distinguish the ‘in’ in the
definiendum from the ‘in’ in the definiens. I disambiguate with subscription. Ackrill
suggests that (i) employs a non-technical notion of being in, writing that “Aristotle has in
mind the occurrence in ordinary Greek of locutions like ‘heat in the water’, ‘courage in
Socrates’.”
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Ackrill takes (A) to entail that nonsubstantial universale can not be in2 individual
substances. He (1963: 74) writes: “Aristotle could not say that generosity is in[2] Callias
as subject, since there could be generosity without any Callias. Only this individual
generosity—Callias’ generosity—is in[2] Callias.” Let’s chart the moves here more
carefully. Consider two claims:
(IEn)
(R)

If X is inseparable from y, then x cannot exist independently from y;
If x cannot exist independently from a subject, then x is nonrecurrent.

(A) presupposes (IEn) in translating adunaton chöris einai as “cannot exist
independently.” Condition (iii) of (A) has the following consequence when conjoined
with(R):
(Al)

Only nonrecurrent properties can be in2 individual substances.

(Al) entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that nonsubstantial universals are
recurrent properties, the claim that nonsubstantial universals can not be in2 individual
substances. This is what Ackrill claims in the above quotation. This, then, is Ackrill’s
argument for the claim that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties: (A) is
the correct reading of la24-5; (A) entails (Al) under the plausible assumption of (R);
nonsubstantial individuals are in individual substances; so nonsubstantial individuals are
nonrecurrent properties.
(Al ) is open to the objection that 2a34-b7 seems to explicitly deny the claim:
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them
as subjects.... [CJolour is in body and therefore also in an individual body; for
were it not in some individual body it would not be in body at all.... So if the
primary substances did not exist it would be impossible for any of the other things
to exist.
This passage seems to say that nonsubstantial universals are present in individual
substances. This entails the denial of (Al) when conjoined with the thesis that universal
properties are recurrent. Ackrill (1963: 83) denies that the passage does have this
entailment, writing that
to say that colour is in body is to say that every instance of colour is in an
individual body. If so, Aristotle’s present formulation is compressed and careless.
For he does not mention individual instances of colour; he speaks as if, because
colour is in body, colour is in an individual body. Strictly, however, it is not
colour, but this individual instance of colour, that is in this individual body; for
colour could exist apart from this body (though this instance of colour could not).
Aristotle’s use of a relaxed sense of ‘in’ may be connected with his almost
complete neglect, after [Categories] Chapter 2, of individuals in non-substance
categories.

4

Subsequent interpreters have ascribed to Aristotle not carelessness but a distinct and
derivative sense of being in. Moravcsik (1967: 87) writes that “general attributes are
indirectly inherent in particular substances.” Allen (1969: 35) takes a similar line,
writing: “the ‘in’ here [in 2a34-b7] is not the technical ‘in’ of presence [i.e., of inherence:
in2], but an ‘in’ derived from i t ... in that the first must obtain if the second is assertible.”
Allen thus takes it that there is a third sense of ‘in’ in the Categories in addition to the
‘in’ of the definiendum of la24-5 and the occurrences of ‘in’ in the dèfiniens: call this
notion being in3. Allen’s reading has the advantage over Ackrill’s of not ascribing
carelessness to Aristotle. Rather, Allen has a precise condition for a universal x to be in3
y: just in case an instance of x is in2 y. Others have gone further. Duerlinger (1970: 1856) explains 2b2-4 by successive applications of two accounts of derivative inherence. Let
us say that A is in4 B iff A is predicated of a and a is in2 B; and that A is in5 B iff, for
some x and some y, A is predicated of x and B is predicated of y, and x is in2 y. Then
color is in5body since color is predicated of a particular color and body is predicated of a
particular body, and the particular color is in2the particular body. Then, by the definition
of being in4, color is in4 the particular body.
Heinaman (1981: 303) and others have been persuaded by this line of response to the
objection to (Al). But it is an unattractive reading of 2a34-b7. For one thing, it requires
positing at least a third sense o f ‘in’, a postulation without independent textual support.
But worse: the reading renders 2a34-b7 unintelligible. For if the sense in which the
nonsubstantial universal colour is in individual substances were not the sense in which
things are claimed at 2a35 to be in the primary substances as subjects, then the claim that
colour is in individual substances would provide no evidence for the claim that all the
other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.
Indeed, 2a34-b7 is entirely mysterious on this reading. If the argument is to be valid, then
each occurrence of ‘in’ must express the same notion of being in; since the first sentence
requires that ‘in’ expresses the notion of being in2, each occurrence o f ‘in’ must express
the notion of being in2.3,4 Call this the problem of providing an unitary reading of ‘in’.

A first recurrence reading of la24-5
Because of this objection to (Al) and other objections,5 Owen (1965) rejects both (A) and
Ackrill’s thesis that nonsubstantial individuals are nonrecurrent properties. He replaces
Ackrill’s thesis with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are properties not predicable
of anything less general. Individual colours, for example, are on this view not instances
but fine-grained hues. Since nonsubstantial individuals are then not nonrecurrent
properties but may exist in more than one subject, Owen cannot interpret la24-5 as (A);
he rather offers the following:
(B)

x is present in y just in case: there is a z such that
(i) x is in y
(ii) x is not a part of y
(iii) x cannot exist apart from z.
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(B) does not entail (Al). However, as Heinaman (1981: 296) and others note, (B) is an
unattractive reading of la24-25: it requires that the indefinite pronoun tini and the relative
clause tou en ho estin in la24-5 have different referents: their referents are represented in
(B) as ‘y’ and ‘z’ respectively. Call this the coreference problem. (B) thus forces an
unnatural reading of la24-5.6
So we have two desiderata. We would like to hold that all occurrences o f ‘in’ in
2a34-b7 express the notion of inherence. The interpretation offered by Ackrill and his
supporters fails to meet this desideratum. And we would like to hold that tini and tou en
ho estin in la24-5 have the same referent. The interpretation offered by Owen and his
supporters fails to meet this desideratum. An interpretation meeting both these desiderata
would, all else being equal, be preferable to either the Ackrill or the Owen interpretation,
for such an interpretation provides a natural reading of the passages.
One point of agreement among the disputants is this: adunaton choris einai is to be
translated as ‘cannot exist apart’. I have labelled this view (IEn). Although (A) and (B)
différas to that to which the inherent property is related, both formulations construe the
relation as entailing an incapacity to exist independently. It is this assumption, when
conjoined with the claim that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-5 have the same referent,
that leads to the undesirable consequence, (Al), which seemingly conflicts with 2a34-b7.
Ackrill and his supporters, having retained both assumptions, have been forced into an
unnatural reading of 2a34-b7. Owen and his supporters, on the other hand, have retained
the assumption that separation is a capacity for independent existence and, preferring the
natural reading of 2a34-b7, have been forced to drop the claim that tini and tou en ho
estin in la24-5 have the same referent.
These two routes are not the only means to avoid the conflict between 2a34-b7 and
(Al ). Might we not instead retain the claim that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-5 have
the same referent and, preferring the natural reading of 2a34-b7, reject the thesis that
separation is a capacity for independent existence? Certainly, this is the prima facie
evidence of the text. Under the natural reading of 2a34-b7, nonsubstantial universals
inhere in individual substances. This entails, when conjoined with the plausible thesis that
universal properties are recurrent, that certain recurrent properties inhere in individual
substances. Generosity can exist in both Callias and Socrates, and so apart from either.
However, given that both are generous, the property is separable from neither.
The disputants seem to have merely assumed that separation is a capacity for
independent existence and have been thus forced into an unnatural reading—either of
2a34-b7 or la24-5. Let us reverse the order of things. First, I advocate the natural reading
of 2a34-b7 and la24-5.1 will avoid commitment to (Al) by rejecting the thesis that
separation is a capacity for independent existence. If I can give an alternative
:
interpretation of separation which nonetheless allows me to retain the natural reading of
the passages, then this alone will provide some reason to prefer the alternative
interpretation to the orthodox. But before giving my reading of this passage. I’ll rehearse
one more wrinkle.
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A better recurrence reading of la24-5
Frede (1987: 62) offers a reading of la24-5 which avoids the coreference problem and is
consistent with the view that nonsubstantial individuals are recurrent. He views the
passage as committed only to the following:
(C)

X is present in a subject if there is a z such that
(i) X is not a part of z
(ii) X cannot exist independently from z.

(C) offers several advantages over (A) and (B). First, (C) avoids the problem of providing
an unitary reading of ‘in’ in la24-5—the problem which sunk (A). Recall, Ackrill needed
to posit two senses of ‘in’ in the passage, so to distinguish the ‘in’ in the definiendum
from the ‘in’ in the definiens. This postulation, we have seen, is difficult to reconcile with
2a34-b7. But the right-hand side of (C) has no ‘in’. As such, no risk of circularity is
incurred and no conflict with 2a34-b7 arises.
A second advantage is that (C) avoids the coreference problem—the problem which
sunk (B). Recall, the difficulty here was that tini and tou en ho estin in la24-25 ought to
have the same referent. (C) sidesteps this problem. la24-5, on Frede’s (1987: 59) reading,
“do not provide a definition of the relation ‘x is in y as its subject’; rather, they provide a
definition of the class of entities that are in something as their subject.” (Italics mine.) As
such, tini can be left unspecified.
Notice, (C) preserves the inseparability thesis: if x is inseparable from y, then x
cannot exit apart from y, and so x is nonrecurrent with respect to the kind of subject that y
is. The strategy of (C) is to shift the subject from which the inherent property is
inseparable. On this reading, for an individual nonsubstance such as this color to be in,
say, Callias only requires that the nonsubstance be inseparable from some entity—for
example, from body. There are no bodiless colors. Part of the appeal of (C) is that, under
Frede’s reading, la24-5 has only these weak and uncontroversial commitments.
Despite the ingenuity and attractiveness of (C), there are several reasons to reject it
as a reading of la24-5. I’ll give two.7 First, (C) reads T mean’ (legetai) as introducing a
merely sufficient condition for being present in a subject. Both (A) and (B), by contrast,
take T mean” as introducing a definition of inherence. However, I find neither reading
compelling. Rather, the most natural reading to my ear is to take T mean’ as introducing a
clarification. Aristotle sometimes uses legein in this way.8 Moreover, a definition of
inherence would be a little odd at thé point in the Categories in which the passage occurs.
The notions of being said of or present in a subject are used to give an initial taxonomy of
beings; their usefulness for this end would be mitigated were they not intuitive
notions—or, at least, intuitive to Aristotle’s intended audience—and so not needing
definitions. Moreover, the said of relation is left undefined: if the notion of inherence is

7
being defined or if a sufficiency condition for inherence is being given, then the
asymmetry is puzzling. So I suspect that Aristotle’s concern in la24-5 is not to define the
present in relation but to distinguish his target notion from another sense of being in a
subject which would also be an intuitive notion to Aristotle’s readers. This is the notion
of being in a subject as a part is in a whole. la24-5 is merely intended to exclude this
sense of being in a subject. This brings me to my second criticism of (C).
Notice, the two conditions, (C, i) and (C, ii), are unrelated. Indeed, there is an
assumption held in common among all of the interpreters we have looked· at so far.
Consider again Ackrill’s translation of la24-5:
By ‘in a subject’ I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot exist
separately from what it is in.
Let’s call the “not as a part” bit the nonmereological condition on inherence and the
“cannot exist separately from what it is in” bit the inseparability condition. The
translation, putting the conditions in the form of a conjunction, reinforces the view that
these are two distinct conditions. This view is held by supporters of all of (A), (B) and
(C). But it’s an unnatural reading of the text. The participle construction in the Greek
suggests that the inseparability condition is an explication of the nonmereological
condition. Recently, Daniel Devereaux (1992: 124-5) has given just such a reading of
la24-5; and although, as I’ll explain below, I disagree with some points of Devereaux’s
interpretation. I’m entirely sympathetic to his view that the nonmereological and
inseparability conditions are related.
So let’s put these two claims together. la24-5 is intended to anticipate a potential
confusion among Aristotle ’s readers. There are several senses of being in a subject,
including the sense in which a part is in a whole. The passage aims to clarify the target
notion of being in a subject by excluding this mereological sense of being in a subject.
Included in the passage is a brief explanation why the target notion is different from the
mereological notion. Unlike the relation holding between a part and its whole, an inherent
property is inseparable from its subject. The desideratum that the inseparability and the
nonmereological conditions of 1a24-5 be related suggests that the relevant notion of
separation, the notion of separation which is denied of inherent properties, is that ascribed
to parts. Now: what is Aristotle’s notion of mereological separation?

Mereological separation
Aristotle at least sometimes holds that parts are inseparable from wholes.9 Consider Meta.
1040b5-8:
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only
potentialities, e g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately
(kechörismenon)·, and when they are separated (chöristhe), then they too exist, all
of them, merely as matter).

δ
Here there seems to be two senses of separation. The occurance of chôristhë refers to
severance.10But what is the sense of kechörismenon? The separation denied of parts here
must be the separation Aristotle elsewhere ascribes to substances and denies of
nonsubstances.11 For the demonstrandum of the passage is that parts are not substances.
This would be established if it could be shown that parts are not separable in the way in
which substances are separable. Under the orthodox view, such separation is a capacity
for independent existence.12' 13
Devereux argues that Aristotle initially held that the parts of substances are
themselves substances and only rejected this view in later writings such as the
Metaphysics. On this view, the Aristotle of the Categories holds that parts are capable of
existence apart from their wholes. So when Aristotle claims in la24-5 that inherent
properties lack the separation which parts possess, he is claiming that they cannot exist
independently from that in which they inhere. The question at hand, then, is: is Devereux
right that the Aristotle of the Categories held that parts are substances? He (1992: 120)
cites several passages as evidence for this claim. But I find that no passage convincingly
supports Devereux’s view. Consider 8b 15-21:
But as for a head or a hand or any such substance, it is possible to know it—what it
itself is—definitely, without necessarily knowing definitely that in relation to
which it is spoken of. For whose this head is, or whose the hand, it is not
necessary to know definitely. So these would not be relatives. And if they are not
relatives it would be true to say that no substance is a relative.
Devereux takes this passage to be claiming that heads and hands are substances. But the
passage can be read as making one of two weaker claims. It may be noting that parts are
thought by some to be substances. The argument, on this reading, is: if parts, which are
controversially claimed by some to be substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori things
which are uncontroversially substances are not relatives. Alternatively, the passage might
be claiming that a head or a hand is homonymously a substance. Of course, a body part
has a semblance of substantiality: it is enformed matter. On this reading, the argument is:
if parts, which are merely homonymously substances, are not relatives, then a fortiori
things which are unequivocally substances are not relatives. At very least, we are not
compelled to read the passage as claiming that parts are, strictly and truly speaking,
substances.14
The issue of mereology and substance in Aristotle is too complex to cover
adequately here. But I see no compelling reason to believe that the Aristotle of the
Categories holds that parts are substances. Moreover, even if he did, this is a substantial
thesis (ho pun intended)—it would serve Aristotle’s purpose at the beginning of the
Categories better to draw not on his technical vocabulary and controversial views but on
uncontroversial and intuitive notions, not on a claim that parts possess ontological
independence but just on the ordinary observation that physical parts are severable.15
This, then, strikes me as the most natural and least contentious reading of la24-5. The
target notion of being in a subject is distinguished from the sense in which a part is in a
whole. For, unlike physical parts, properties cannot be severed from what they are in.
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I’ll conclude. We’ve rehearsed a debate on whether or not nonsubstantial individuals
are recurrent properties. If my reading is correct, there is the following disappointing
consequence. The passages la24-5 and 2a34-b7 give us no reason to prefer one view over
the other. Indeed, when the false assumption of the debate, that separation is a capacity
for independent existence, is exposed, the debated interpretation of these passages can be
seen as not germane to the issue. A property which inheres in an individual subject cannot
be separated—ihat is to say, severed—from its subject: but this entails neither that the
property is recurrent nor that it’s nonrecurrent. For neither a recurrent property—being
pale, say—nor a nonrecurrent property—being my pale, say—can be severed from me.
So, if we are to give an account of nonsubstantial individuals in Aristotle, we need to
look elsewhere.16*17
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in no way substances, not even homonymously, not that they are not, strictly speaking, substances. ...
Other passages cited by Devereux include 298a29-32: “As substances I class the simple bodies—fire,
earth, and the other terms of the series—and all things composed of them; for example, the heaven as a
whole and its parts, animals, again, and plants and their parts.” But this passage doesn’t classify the parts of
plants and animals as themselves substances but contrasts organic substsances, articulated with parts, with
the simple elemental bodies. Devereux also cites 818b5-8, but the work containing this passage is spurious.
15 Frede (1987, 61) views the nonmereological condition as denying that inherent properties are definitional
parts. Again, I find this an overly theory laden reading, if we can provide an account which doesn’t require
the beginning of the Categories to presuppose so much Aristotelian technology, then so much the better.
16Indeed, the interpretation of inherence is not quite the right focus for the issue of nonsubstantial
individuals, since the property of inhering in a subject is not unique to the class: nonsubstantial universal
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also inhere in a subject. For this reason, the relative neglect, in the literature on this issue, of Jones 1972
and 1974 is regrettable. Jones follows Aristotle’s gloss, at lb6-7, 3bl2 and 4al0-21, on ‘individual’ as
‘what is one in number’ to provide an account based on Meta. I. Annas (1974) raises some ‘queries’ for
this position—Aristotle never himself offers Jones’ account of individuals and indeed seems to offer an
alternative account at 1089b24-8—but neither of these problems are insurmountable.
17 Thanks to Sean Kelsey, Gavin Lawrence and Calvin Normore for discussion.

